Category Archives: Politics

Palestinian Youth – to start again

Re: “Years of Strife and Lost Hope Scar Young Palestinian Lives” (The New York Times, 12 March 2007): Steven Erlanger reports of the youthful fighters that “All of them want to leave and start again, somewhere.”

Intriguing to compare this sentiment with the attitude of a “Galilean pioneer” in Arthur Koestler’s novel, “Thieves in the Night”: “We don’t want to change and we don’t want to improve, we want to begin from the beginning.”

It seems by now the government of Israel would have learned the ultimate futility of forcible ghettoization. That which inspired revolutionary actions in Zionist history is likely to have the same effect on others today.

Probably there will never be sustainable government (let alone democracy) where walls and ghettos are necessary.

911 and 9/11

Amidst the sad news of the Bronx fire that brought tragedy to “an entire Malian and Muslim community” (“Horrific Blaze Unites Cultures in Rituals of Grief,” The New York Times, 10 March 2007), there was perplexity that the residents called relatives and tried to extinguish the fire themselves instead of calling 911 to get the firefighters.

Is it really any surprise in the climate of imprisonment and ruthless deportation that surrounds immigrants in America after 9/11 that a Malian or Muslim woman immigrant would hesitate to call 911? Pervasive legal threats to one’s family and livelihood will produce a reluctance to encounter officialdom in any rational person.

That New Yorkers’ hearts opened to these families is wonderful testimony to the ability of citizens to reach beyond the official paranoia and hostility of their national government. Mayor Bloomberg would do well to build on this heart-felt response to articulate the sound municipal reasons why an immigration policy of fear-mongering is dangerous to civic well-being.

Crime Surge

A police chief is quoted, that the U.S. crime surge is an “economic and social” problem: “We seem to be dealing with an awful lot of people who have zero conflict-resolution skills.” (“Violent Crime in Cities Shows Sharp Surge,” The New York Times (9 March 2007).

Not surprising. The entire country, under Bush-Cheney and the neo-cons, has zero conflict-resolution skills. The Iraq invasion and the war threats against Korea and Iran, to name the highlights, have set a tone and provided horrendous examples of how (not) to deal with conflict.

Our children learn from what they observe their leaders doing. Add to this the despair of poverty, the lure of drugs, and the cheerleading of the NRA and some media, and we have the recipe for exactly the kind of social disintegration the police chiefs are having to deal with.

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Addenda:

After Karl Rove “rejected the suggestion that future presidents might be deterred from the Bush doctrine by the enduring violence and unintended consequences let loose by the invasion of Iraq,” Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser in the Carter administration, said the next President “will have to make serious readjustments with rationality.” [“Rove Doing His Part to Help Shape a Positive Legacy for BushThe Washington Post (9 March 2007)]

This one says it all:

Gen. Tony McPeak (retired), Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War: “This is a dark chapter in our history. Whatever else happens, our country’s international standing has been frittered away by people who don’t have the foggiest understanding of how the hell the world works. America has been conducting an experiment for the past six years, trying to validate the proposition that it really doesn’t make any difference who you elect president. Now we know the result of that experiment [laughs]. If a guy is stupid, it makes a big difference.” [“Beyond Quagmire,” Rolling Stone (7 March 2007)]

Civilian coup?

I remember studying military coups, and wondering whether that might ever happen in the U.S., or whether our Constitutional traditions are strong enough to preserve civilian control. I don’t recall wondering whether the opposite might occur: that civilian leaders would override the military; it almost doesn’t make logical sense to ask the question that way. After all, civilians are supposed to be in control, right? And the military is presumed to be more likely to want to go to war than the civilians, right? Apparently not.

I think it’s fair to say the Bush-Cheney neo-con regime has staged a coup against the military. The decision to invade Iraq, and all that entails, was made in opposition to senior military advice. A February 25, 2007, report in the Times of London indicates there is continuing resistance and unrest in the highest levels of the military: “Some of America’s most senior military commanders are prepared to resign if the White House orders a military strike against Iran….”

Debate on this topic is also occurring among military rank & file, as is evident in a discussion on military.com: When columnist Joseph Galloway went out of his way to criticize the Bush-Cheney regime in his commentary on the veterans’ medical care scandal at Walter Reed Hospital, the discussion board lit up with remarks that included debate about the civilian command overriding military advice. While critics were not in the majority at the time I read the board, they were a strong voice.

The invasion is still going on and the Constitution is in crisis; but the increasing concern among military and civilian alike encourages me.

Clans and state – Somaliland

Yesterday’s The New York Times reports on “The Other Somalia: An Island of Stability in a Sea of Armed Chaos” (7 March 2007, A11).

The gist of the article is that Somaliland (the northern part of Somalia) has achieved peace and social stability through an integration of tribal, clan and national institutions. In contrast, the rest of Somalia, trying to organize via Western-style (and supported) governance, continues to be in chaos. The 19th century colonial pasts of these two regions partly explains the present situation: Somaliland went to the British, who, in their fashion of “indirect rule,” relied on pre-existing clan chiefs; Somalia went to the Italians, who brought thousands of administrators to rule directly. After decolonization in 1960, the two regions merged, but only Somaliland was able to sustain a viable government; Somalia collapsed into violence, from which it has not yet emerged.

Law & Society scholars and others have long discussed the differences between clan and state systems. Some relegate clan organizations to the realm of historical anthropology, while others focus on contemporary clan systems in so-called “less developed” societies. Only a few regard tribe and clan as relevant to “advanced” societies. The Times article is valuable for its display of the historical picture as a foundation for contemporary political process.

Though the Times article makes no mention of Iraq or Afghanistan, we may understand that each of those countries has a historical foundation of clan governance. In Iraq, this becomes occasionally visible in the proposals for partitioning into three areas; in Afghanistan, almost every report acknowledges the clan structure, in then guise of “warlords.”

To the extent that we comprehend clan and tribe as historical and contemporary phenomena, we may better investigate how and when and where these modes of social organization may not only help provide, but be necessary ingredients for peace and stability. Where these modes have been destroyed, we may be in the position of Humpty Dumpty: “All the King’s horses and all the King’s men couldn’t put him back again.”

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After I wrote this note, I read Rory Stewart’s Op-Ed piece about Afghanistan and Iraq in the same issue of the Times: “The Value of Their Values”. Though he uses the term “values,” it’s clear from the text that he is referring to “social structures” as well as personal behaviors. His conclusion:

Our invective about state failure and our dissatisfaction have become part of the problem. Real solutions will emerge, often improbably, from local individual virtues, and from the cultures we struggle to describe and tend to ignore.