Leopoldo Gómez-Ramírez, Ph.D. candidate in the Economics Department, has published an article titled “On Theories of a Democratic Planned Economy and the Coevolution of ‘Pro-democratic Planning’ Preferences” in International Critical Thought, Volume 4, Issue 2, 2014.
The motivation problem is a common component of discussions about democratic planning. This paper focuses in particular on individuals’ motivation to work hard and to engage in the scrutiny of public affairs, both necessary traits for the success of a planned economy. The analysis draws on tools from the evolutionary game theory literature to consider whether the models of Pat Devine (Negotiated Coordination Economy, or NCE) and Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel (Participatory Economics, or Parecon) offer convincing solutions. I argue the proliferation of those traits would not naturally occur at the outset of democratic planning. I discuss selection mechanisms that increase the likelihood of successful proliferation of individually costly traits: segmentation, conformism, and group-level interactions. However, I argue that, under the impact of the defining institutions of NCE/Parecon, segmentation or conformism would not achieve the desired proliferation. The central conclusion of this paper is, then, that more sanctions and incentives at the group-level should be incorporated to the institutional design of these models.